

2-2 24 (no flight)
No flight: 16, 21, 28 (no flight), 29-31, 1-2 Nov

Last two flights: 15 Nov 30-31 none;

29 Oct: Continuing analysis of 27 Oct showed
continuing construction & concealment. Camouflage &
concealment were becoming more effective.

all DIS: K's 23 Oct message appeared to be an
attempt to ward off any contemplated US action that
might destroy the bases. No proof ["hands"?]
told the Sams had begun dismantling missile sites on
TH-350. Latest photos taken prior to low altitude,
showed construction proceeding rapidly.

(no flight)

30 Oct: No evidence in 29 Oct low-level photos that
Sams were dismantling or erecting any of offensive
missile sites. On the contrary, construction of fuel
storage bunkers & concealment activities were
continuing.

no flight

31 Oct: Available evidence still did not indicate any preparation
for dismantling or erecting the sites. Although many missile
erectors had been removed from their hardstands, the extent
believed to have had any effect on the full force.

Dir. 5th Div. 1st Div. After comparing photos of 27-29 Oct.

to evidence of directly, evidence of additional construction
as well as of extensive construction.

Tracy

C. How. from low-level photos of 1 Nov. shows main road running

30 Oct

Not involved in negotiation... rights of US to surveillance,
without interference, as long as US guaranteed a way
the non-invasion of Cuba.

Still mentioned only offensive systems.

C. How: in note page

15 Nov: last low-level. Castro letter to O. Plant. coming to him on
US recon. aircraft. [Should be taken in 1961?]

16 Nov. SLA recon. low-level flight for 17 Nov. out and
fully defended targets, ready fight escort missions.

Refused to let that kind of recon. at optimum posture to
enable Cuba Air strikes & invasion. Could maintain for 30 days.

[Disappeared? No low-level after 15th] (over)

7 Nov: recommend to Sec Def. US reaction to a hostile
attack on US women aircraft be:

1) Protest to USSR re: attack on US and return:

2) Full attack on all airfields & air defense weapons
system in Cuba, & consideration of additional measures, if not
judged part of deliberate program of resistance to surveillance,
or c) if not judged isolated incident, limited retali-
ation, preferably against responsible side.

9 Nov: JCS comes with USA paper "Long Term Surveillance
Requirements": complete high level coverage every 30 days &
low-level flights on on-site inspection of suspicious locations;
sufficient low-level flights to protect the "right" to
survive flights whether or not suspicious activities were located,
& stopping surveillance.

04:

18 Nov: Cuba could interfere with US, little with low-level

19 Nov: in view of high level coverage against low-level flights

19-20 Nov, to recommend only US-2 for 20 Nov, nothing more on
US reaction to hostile side (7 Nov)

20 Nov: Rules of Engagement for high altitude of low level. Question
of target area.

[Have two brief flights been started again?

Note: determine based on Castro threats.

(Are longer brief flights needed? Attitude on
"incidents"? Contingency?)

Cuba's (like Sept 4) with Pass statement on 20 Nov,
was continued.

See: 24 mms, Brown Baggage in Cabin. to Red.

1. STAN's Magic Wand

Demands for: outside money in form of:
 capital. Want to know

2. Why and why? What are the consequences?

3. Timing, Power, Life: Timing of VCS, affecting conflict,
lack of analysis, evidence not provided.

Spinal; inability to move, rationalize for wrong.

Control of this activity

4. Block Influence of system analysis in OSL and lenses

Thin style: p analysis. Applied to larger cytochrome quantities
of B₂ polymer to further C_{12} ions.

Thin Limitations 1000 (S. H. N. e.)

Done for

5. Change, innovation, evolution & budgeting & policy decisions

How far back

Very little of 188, now added 186, 1864, and 536. The same, 1864.

6. Attitudes toward change & influence:

Elisabeth; Papoport; White Building; White;
Newman.

7. Difference between public relations and sociological work

(Kolm; Schilling, 1941).

note: comparing with, given thing.

Difference between then & now.

8. Analysis continues. Is this a good thing? Are we glad?

Two types

Kolm: (longer side).

9. Real problem of data: e.g. Bank Savings

Real & bad analyses: simplicity, destruction of the best of them.

Failures of prediction with best: R-Index.

10. But what are alternatives?

Elisabeth: but, collect of "wisdom" & "intelligence".

Still relevance of experience, tacit knowledge.

Kolm: 10. Attention is not "knowledge", but
a certain mass of information things & the complexity of which.

It is not cause of influence of OSD; but source of
info on consequences, national objectives, perspective (C+C)

Simplicity is essential, but...

Planning for alternatives ^{is} very good, but lack of
planning, or one-option planning

Single models; strategies; single factors, dichotomies.

^a
Kahn: need for response ^{to} [?]

But: 1) descriptive process; innovation, etc.

C+C
Coordinated response
to exts

2) like candle, demands darkness to use, the

size & importance of the room

Difficult to see

2244 A+L Foreign Cars 548-3443

3500 Lff Drums

Rv S Import Motors Lincoln Station, Wash + DC

Happy Center, 123 S. Wayne, Ind.

527-9627

Col. Sanders

53155

Robert Paul 1155

13-24062

Wicks

late

27 Oct: No evidence of ~~loss~~ intent to halt construction;

5 sites open, 6th by 28 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct. implied presence of FROs,

tanks, armored vehicles, in a camp.

A U-2 over Cuba reported overdue,
(where?) then missing; presumed down. Where plane's location

unknown, & whether loss had resulted from hostile action

Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot's

body established location, but Castro never explicitly

acknowledged shooting down.

ICS recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct

under irrefutable evidence of dismantling obtained in

operation.

Loss of U-2 assumed by ICS with SecDef in light

of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.

(Inform Pres through SAC/DOC ^{prob.} recommend immediate

retal. against the ^{most} likely ~~200~~, and prob continue U-2).

In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

24 Oct. R: ships mostly not observed.

25 Oct. 3 ^{unreported minute comers} SC ships, reportedly changing course; all 311

dry cargo ships seemed to be pulling back from
mainstream line.

26 Oct. 3 low ships now steering east, not all but
on dry cargo ships.

Letter from K, 23 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 23 Oct.

Letter by K, 24 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 25 Oct.

Letter by K, 26 Oct.

Second letter by K, 27 Oct.

Ans. by JFK, 27 Oct.

27 Oct. K: We would not be instructed to submit to

pressure, and should US forces "violate" international

law of navigation, USSR would take the measures deemed

necessary.

[When did ship draw back?]

28 Oct. report of drawback.

JFK answer: SU had made first challenge, US had

responded. If prod we would take action necessary

to restore pre-crisis sit.

20 Oct, after 1300: decided SAC alert can hold be moved from
unlimited basis beginning 22 Oct.

21 Oct: Interruption should be obtained from SecDef

to disperse COMAD fighters and SAC B-47s the
afternoon of 22 Oct.

To recommend (to whom?) that SAC initiate
force generation, COMAD should be dispersed of
one round interruption, and SAC implement partial air alert
(whom?)

22. JCRC was to inform SACSEC of developments

US forces to go to increased alert (?) at P-3am,
except for EUCOM. (?) 2300, 22 Oct. SECINCEUR
to use his discretion in complying with directives in light
of warning order of 21 Oct (?)

SAC would initiate, gradually & gradually, partial 2.2
beginning 1200, 22 Oct.

SAC, at his discretion (?) implement B-47 dispersal
beginning 1200, 22 Oct. COMAD likewise, on quiet basis

Subject to SecDef approval, SAC generation beginning 1200,
22 Oct to max at 1200, 23 Oct.

(SecDef knows? Unknown?)

23 Nov: (after Summary, 12 Nov)

DIS 2-4 planes in 2nd force;
now believed to number about 10,000

24 personnel

6 Oct: believed 5-6000.

19 Oct: not less than 5-9000 specialists.

27 Oct: Photos of 25 Oct showed camp, FROG, tanks, ^{at perimeter}

8 Nov: 2 Nov. photos showed more FROG, etc. to perimeter.

4 Nov: around battalions in camp.

7 Nov: low personnel with 3900

crucial units, 500

at least 1230 troops for defense of perimeter:

4 tank battalions (each with
31 T-54 tanks
and 250 mm)

10 Nov: DIS in Cuban/low force

12 Nov: photos of 10 Nov showed air-to-air missiles for Mig-21s.

photos of 9 Nov suggested that the 4 2nd units were

composite, around or much greater strength of near organized strength.

13. (Nov) evidence indicated greater strength groupings but

total of well over 4000 troops (rather than 2000-3000).

14. Nov. Believed to be on 16 Nov; 17-23 is around, prof. by vegetation,
thick blockade and, found by, by air action, that US mobile withdrawal of
a sub-permanent, in considerable, veget. signature, [?]

Chronology

5 Aug: news cleared no signif. military buildup.
possible 419;

10 Aug: SA-2 sites. first sig. landmarks in Cuban military features.

see Daily South News (DIN) of Sept 6 ("defensive")

1 Sept: first proof of 14B-25.

4 Oct: DIA established Cuban 2nd. Column 34 km from

10 Oct: DIA received Navy photo later. Later reports of
photos of 25 Sept. probable IL-28 units.

[Overall defensive picture. is it what VCS believe?]

VCS meeting 1400-1700 on 15 Oct: possible ops against Cuba.

[Did they know yet? Had they already concluded?]

What of Cuban SecDef requests for planes?]

20 Oct 1964 "hand" evidence on new workbooks.

Re: first "hand" evidence was tracing of "body" and
weapons storage bunker.

(Suppose earlier reference to products was had
previously, and some standards of "handness".

Why a conviction on 27 Oct that decision on air
most must be soon?

(What was report on re of U-2 aircraft, findings?)

(What would we have done about further shootdowns?)

When/has did DeDy/Exxon been if or participate in decision
on SAC airborne alert, dispersal, C-130s dispersal,

SAC force generation?

(When did SAC actually begin generation?
What changed?)

What was SAC response between 12 and 7, 22 Oct?

Use of offer

8 in Kentucky: pushed for their conventional cap (State, Army)
But Baldwin stonies.

Paine concept on Army

He. reluctant on ones. Felt not informed of final thought on ones
Johnson. JCS attempt to unite a Treaty with Pres. (Lass)
Thy will agree, if he will guarantee that if... he will...

25. 31 Oct. (when requested? 27 Oct?)

General belief: That in event of a low attack on facilities in Turkey

with HE, 6 alternatives available that didn't involve

US use of nukes: a) NATO in blocks with cover.

impro on selected military targets & satellites;

b) same, for USSR, c) Destruction of low bases on high area;

d) Sub warfare on all blue shipping & naval bases;

e) Seizure of blue shipping as opportunity presented;

f) With NATO allies, closing Bosporus, Dardanelles, &

Black Straits to blue shipping.

Less effective: delayed impact measures: increasing

US defenses in Europe & Med. & closing Panama Canal.

NATO strategy was based on principle that

Pointed out: any low blue attack on a NATO country

would call for immediate military retaliation by NATO;

therefore, a low attack on facilities under circumstances

given (?) highly improbable.

[Like judgment on low flying missiles in Cuba!]

5) Pass to 621.

Directed: SAC that message would be moved from

16 Oct. Air Task (MARM) could be initiated 24 hrs
after approval; begin strike + invasion, 16 days.

18 Oct. earliest possible date for strike, 21 Oct;
after 23 Oct; earliest for invasion, 23 Oct.

19 Oct. presented to Pres at 1000 hrs: only satisfactory
solution to the Cuban problem from the military point of
view was air force attack on communication targets,
weapn, complete blockade, & ultimately invasion.

Recognized, a strain on alliances & problems with Berlin.

20 Oct. 1000-1400. Talking Paper for C.I.C.S. for afternoon
with meeting (Adm.).

Approved:

[All] drafted by Bundy. Air Task within (19 Oct),
possible was stated (22 Oct), announcement (23 Oct),
Pres speech (23 Oct).

1815: informal of Decision. C.I.C.S. to report to JCS (blockade).

JCS to be prepared to execute strike against missiles w/o:
1) without warning 22 or 23 Oct, if this is better; 2) when circumstances
warrant invasion or strike.

16 Oct. 1963 1230-1345

i. Selective MRBM strike dangerous; in attack on
MRBMs + MIGs only, unsound, as US should strike air
bases, air defenses and SAMs to eliminate the total
threat. (Also, tanks and all other signif. military
targets - those which can offset US in its power. The
objection, to eliminate threat to US and
liberate Cuba. [Why this dropped?] [escalation?
allies?]
air strike + blockade acceptable.
See evidence sheet + to be heard.

17 Oct. 0930-1610. Discuss possible US reactions
from US (Berlin, Germany, Iran, Turkey, Korea); most
likely Berlin. Most likely US reactions to us, in Iran,
or by an ICBM "accident" on Pacific Test Site (Johnston
Island). [?] and that should strong emergency
action at Berlin, threat of regime, could reasonably be expected.

Plans for US Def. 101 confirmed since, presented orally

18 Oct. 1000-1030. Discussion of all military targets + blockade; showing
sheet on ICBM alone, claim of Castro would require invasion.

Stevenson - Sec 10/31/62

Sec Amb told U Thant

Order from K to dismantle received between 1 and 3 pm.
Started dismantling by 5 on Sunday. Will be all over
it later by Friday, when we will have finished
bulldozing of sites. Even the pads will be gone, but
no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.

As to aircraft, Puccio assured them that no Cubans had
not been trained to fly them. Any equipment, low-manned
will go. All the A-4, but B414 is conventional, is named by
Cubans. It was a Cuban Colonel that shot down our plane.

Castro is frustrated, intense, hysterical.

Package please log off the recon till Friday after that you
will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.

11/1/62 Bell - Sec. Castro talked as though he had all the info
aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had

what down Major Anderson. Ridge himself is not at all
persuaded that this was ^{not} first ~~not~~ only boastfulness on his
part.

He feels that there is a state of very definite kind of
hysteria down there at the moment; that they are absolutely
going to be looking for flights today and that they are going
to throw everything that they have. After Castro makes his speech
he thinks that if we could delay until tomorrow that the
chances of getting into any real trouble are considerably diminished,
particularly if we change the flight patterns ...

(The night went to have to invite him, but went down... 34)
He said on a security Council meeting that Castro would not like
to hold the meeting off till after the 6th...

Spec: Why the 6th!

Ball: Why, on elections

McN-Bell 11/5 11:59

From intercept, looks as if we have lost a plane,
a low-level one shot down by Russian-speaking people, &
it appears we have a fighter attack on two of our other
aircraft. Our own aircraft have not yet reported in.
... I should be held very close.

11/3/62 10 am Bundy-Bell

Stavros not shown JFK reply to K, put: Office too busy
Bundy: Reason for big edgy is that the very existence of secret
correspondence with K has been a nuisance in the past;
the moment anyone says there is a message, we have
to show it to Alpbach; then we are in trouble - as the
message of the 26th shows.

[10/27/62: 10:50 See had arranged to send off 9 or 26 letter to
London, Paris + Frankfurt, with instructions to give to Mac + de G.
[Other: telling Alpbach is like publishing in NYT]